The VARIG AIRLINES difference

This is a personal account of two similar aviation events with utterly different outcomes. The first event is depicted as a routine flight of the now defunct Brazilian flagship carrier, Varig Airlines. The second is a tragedy that occurred three years later with another Brazilian airline. The similarities of the two incidents are remarkable; however, the outcomes could not have been more diverse.

Company	VARIG Airlines	TAM
Date	08/1993	10/1996
Airplane	B737-241	F28-100
Airport	GYN	CGH
Runway	Length(rwy14)-2000m, altitude 2440 ft, temperature 32ºC , QNH-1013 Hpa, wind calm, CAVOK	Length(rwy17)-1960m, altitude 2632 ft, temperature 26ºC , QNH-1013 Hpa, wind calm, CAVOK
Incident	During the takeoff run a flock of birds (herons) struck at V1 causing the left engine ingestion, stall and an uncommanded reverser deployment.	Uncommanded thrust reverser deployment of right engine while passing 200 ft altitude during initial climb.
Sequence of events	The acft was commanded to accelerate to V2, took-off single engine, retracted landing gear, climbed to 500 ft, retracted flaps, performed engine fire/severe damage checklist, reverser unlocked checklist and after take-off checklist, declared emergency, requested landing priority, continued climbing to 1,500 ft, entered the visual approach pattern, performed one engine inoperative approach and landing checklists and landed safely.	The acft dived onto the ground with landing gear down, flaps in take-off configuration whilst both crew members were focused on struggling against the throttle lever movement until the airplane crashed to the ground and exploded.
Aircraft damages	Engine nr. 1 replaced 6 hours after the event and the acft returned to duty (same crew) after 18 hours.	Total destruction of the aircraft and a few houses.
Fatalities	None (besides 5 ingested herons...)	6 crew members 89 passengers 4 ground fatalities

Observe that the two events occurred in similar weather conditions, almost same altitude airports and almost identical runways regarding their physical characteristics (runway length and altitude) and both during the takeoff phase of their flights (although the Varig airplane was still on the ground, during takeoff run). 

You may have already noticed there is a very likely similarity between the circumstances when those two events occurred, albeit their outcomes are completely different.

The Varig incident became only an uneventful occurrence thanks to crew training, CRM, and strict adherence to Varig’s Operations Manual Standard Operational Procedures and Boeing 737-200 Flight Crew Operations Manual / Non-Normal Procedures.

The Captain and the First Officer acted according to those protocols of regulations and acted text book the required procedures following the engine stall/reverser deployment.

The Captain simply flew the airplane as he was expected to perform in that condition, commanded the First Officer to read and accomplish the appropriate checklists and performed the correct actions to handle the abnormal situation.

In the TAM’s incident both crew spent the last moments of their lives (while the airplane plunged from 200 ft to the ground...) struggling to push forward the throttle lever (the throttle moves backwards when the reverse thrust is deployed; mechanically driven by the reverser activation, by design) and simply forgot the first and most important action during an emergency:

FLY THE AIRPLANE!

The airplane hit the ground while the two pilots kept struggling against the throttle mechanical linkage and cussing the airplane instead of simply…flying her, or more specifically, retracting the landing gear, stabilizing in a climb-out attitude, performing simple and elementary tasks that were supposed to be known by heart or by training.

No CRM, no Standard Operational Procedures, no Simulator Training was ever provided by TAM to their crews?

That was exactly the point that the Brazilian Aviation Authorities had never cared to look after and also, never cared to mention in any post accident report.

The majority of Brazilian pilots know very well the circumstances involving most of TAM’s accidents (unfortunately they are many, taking into account the young age of the company…) and the way the Brazilian Authorities simply close their eyes to evidences, according to their whims and agendas.

I decided to present this  because I was the Captain of the flight VRG 260 that suffered the reported uneventful incident of Birds strike/ingestion.

© Antonio Carlos Arantes De Biasi